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Abstract
The capital management problem posed by R. H. Strotz is analyzed for the case of the “naive”
planner who fails to anticipate changes in his own preferences. By imposing progressively stronger
restrictions on the primitives of the problem — namely, the discounting function, the utility
index function, and the investment technology — the planner’s behavior is characterized first
as the solution to an ordinary differential equation and then via explicit formulae. Inasmuch as
these characterizations leave the discounting function essentially unrestricted, the theory can
accommodate, in particular, decision makers who discount time according to the hyperbolic
and “quasi-hyperbolic” curves used in applied work and said to be supported by psychological
studies. Comparative statics of the model are discussed, as are extensions of the analysis to
allow for credit constraints, limited foresight, and partial commitment.
JEL classification: D91, E21
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1. Introduction
When Robert H. Strotz published his investigation (1955–1956) of “Myopia and In-
consistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization,” he credited Allais, Hayek, and Samuelson
with having already raised, or having at least (p. 165) “alluded to” the questions that he
went on to address. But despite this generosity, it is Strotz’s paper that has come to be
considered the cornerstone of the branch of economic theory that studies agents whose
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preferences change over time, and whose voluntary choices at one moment they might
themselves disagree with at another.
It may be that Strotz’s contribution is still remembered so long after its appearance
mainly because the framework in which he formulated the issue of time inconsistency
remains, for the most part, that in which it is studied today. His paper considered a choice
at variable time τ among feasible consumption plans C with the goal of maximizing a
utility function of the form (p. 167)∫ T
0
λ(t− τ)u(C(t), t)dt, (1)
and in this setting he showed that time consistency of the decision maker’s behavior is
equivalent to log-linearity of the discounting function λ (a specification that he dubbed,
p. 172, “the harmony case”). In doing so, Strotz of course also demonstrated what is
needed to model a time-inconsistent decision maker. And in addition he introduced
the important distinction between the cognitive assumptions of “sophistication” (i.e.,
awareness of any inconsistency) and “naivete” (the absence of such awareness), discussing
each of these two possibilities in turn. 2
If the first few papers to follow up on Strotz’s essay (namely, those of Pollak, 1968;
Peleg and Yaari, 1973; and Goldman, 1980) dealt primarily with the sophisticated agent,
it is only because his analysis of this case (pp. 173–175) was soon found to be defective
(see Pollak, 1968, pp. 207–208) and led to an extended and productive debate about
the nature of strategic equilibrium in dynamic “intrapersonal” games. 3 Less easy to
understand is why, when applied work incorporating time inconsistency finally began to
appear — with notable contributions by Laibson (1997, 1998), Barro (1999), Harris and
Laibson (2001, 2004), and Krusell and Smith (2003) — sophistication continued to be
imposed with at most a cursory acknowledgement that there might be an alternative. This
custom seems to have originated in the first of the applied papers just mentioned, where
Laibson declared (p. 451) that it had become “standard practice to formally model a
consumer as a sequence of temporal selves making choices in a dynamic game (e.g., Pollak
[1968], Peleg and Yaari [1973], and Goldman [1980]).” But the papers cited here are, of
course, precisely the three mentioned above in connection with the purely theoretical
project of correcting the defective Strotzian analysis; these authors do not even take up
the question of whether the sophisticated agent is an appropriate modelling device for
any particular applied problem; and thus it appears that assuming sophistication has
become standard practice simply by being described as such, and with less than adequate
consideration of its relative merits vis-a-vis naivete in the economic contexts of interest.
In the context of savings behavior, Laibson (1997, p. 444) does offer the argument that
observed large holdings of illiquid assets constitute evidence that investors sometimes
“prefer to constrain their own future choices”; and as examples of such “golden egg”
investments he mentions real estate, business equity, durable goods, pensions, and other
retirement (e.g., IRA, Keogh, and 401k) plans. There is undoubtedly some truth to this
claim, though Laibson himself concedes there to be other reasons to purchase a house
or a Honda than merely (p. 443) to remove money from one’s bank account before
one has a chance to spend it. And rather than as intrapersonal commitment devices
2 This terminology is apparently due to Pollak (1968).
3 This question has been addressed more recently by Asheim (1997).
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designed by sophisticates to achieve self-control, it may be more realistic to interpret
matched savings and tax-advantaged retirement plans as incentive schemes designed by
paternalistic employers and governments to manipulate the behavior of their employees
and constituents.
Two excellent points of departure for thinking about these issues are the Richard T. Ely
lectures delivered, respectively, by Thomas Schelling (1984) and George Akerlof (1991).
The first deals exclusively with sophistication, the second with naivete, and the two
together suffice to dismiss any claim that one or the other assumption is universally
valid. 4 These lectures, which merit being read in their entirety, will not be summarized
here. But it is worth pointing out that while the problem of intertemporal resource
allocation is mentioned only in passing (p. 6) in the course of Schelling’s engaging tour of
sophisticated behavior, it features prominently in Akerlof’s (pp. 6–7) discussion of naive
decision making.
Yet another source of insightful commentary on Strotz’s cognitive dichotomy is the
more recent work of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,b, 2001) on the opposing phenomena
of procrastination and preproperation. In the first of the cited papers, these authors take
on the task of (p. 104) “explicitly comparing [the two] competing assumptions,” and
having done so warn (p. 119) that while “[p]eople clearly have some degree of sophisti-
cation, . . . economists should be cautious when [working] solely with [this] assumption.”
At the same time, they observe that presuming awareness of changing preferences does
seem entirely natural from the perspective of rational choice orthodoxy; indeed, another
eminent economic theorist has suggested that conscious or unconscious imperatives of
professional self-preservation have had as much to do with the traditional bias towards
sophistication as any reasoned argument in its favor.
Our intention in this paper, however, is not to adjudicate territorial disputes between
the two assumptions in question — this being a task for empirical or experimental work
informed by cognitive psychology. Rather, our aim is simply to provide an alternative
to the established methodology based on sophistication by investigating the pure theory
of the naive agent; understanding, of course, that any satisfactory picture of the role
of time inconsistency in human decision making is likely to combine elements of both
approaches. 5 Happily, filling the vacuum left by the neglect of the naivete assumption
will require simply that we carry out the analysis of this case hinted at decades ago by
Strotz himself, and for this reason the reader may wish to glance again at the relevant
section (pp. 170–171) of his paper.
More concretely, our goal is to characterize the behavior of a naive planner faced with
a generalized version of the Strotzian capital management problem mentioned above. At
each moment, taking into account the level of the capital stock inherited from earlier
moments, such an agent will identify that feasible consumption plan which is optimal
4 Schelling writes (p. 1, emphasis added) that “a person in evident possession of her faculties and
knowing what she is talking about will rationally seek to prevent, to compel, or to alter her own later
behavior — to restrict her own options in violation of what she knows will be her preference at the time
the behavior is to take place.” Akerlof, with other situations in mind, declares (p. 17, emphasis added)
that a “modern view of behavior, based on twentieth-century anthropology, psychology, and sociology
is that individuals have utilities that do change and, in addition, they fail fully to foresee those changes
or even recognize that they have occurred.”
5 O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) have already taken a step in this direction by allowing for what they
call “partial naivete.”
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with respect to his current preferences — a plan that we too can identify by solving the
ordinary differential equation (ODE) that expresses the decision maker’s first-order con-
dition for optimality. Failing to anticipate any impending change in his own outlook, the
planner will use this currently-optimal plan to choose his instantaneous rate of consump-
tion; or, equivalently, the rate of increase of his stock of capital. The resulting relationship
between the level of the capital stock (appearing in the current resource constraint) and
its time derivative (the current choice variable) then sets up a second ODE, and it is by
solving this equation that we can obtain the actual, “historical” capital and consumption
paths.
Starting with a completely nonparametric problem, defined and discussed in Section 2,
we shall carry out the analysis sketched above by adopting at each stage the weakest set
of functional-form assumptions that will allow us to proceed analytically. 6 This method
will lead naturally to a sequence of characterizations of the planner’s behavior: first, in
Section 3.1, as the output of a schematic algorithm; second, in Section 3.2, as the solution
to an initial value problem; third, in Section 3.3, via explicit formulae for the historical
capital path; and fourth, in Section 3.4, via simplified formulae that may or may not
be expressible in closed form. In Section 4 we examine some comparative statics of the
model, testing whether changes in various parameters (such as the interest rate) can be
shown to shift the consumption profile either forward or backward in time. Section 5.1
illustrates how savings behavior is affected when the planner becomes subject to a simple
credit constraint. And finally, Section 5.2 shows both how the analysis can be generalized
to allow for limited foresight, and how this generalization can be used to model a decision
maker with the capacity to partially (but not fully) commit to the ex-ante-optimal plan.
2. Model
2.1. The planner’s problem
The calendar date t will advance as a continuous variable from the initial date 0
through a fixed planning horizon T > 0. At calendar date t, the scheduling date s will
range over the interval [t, T ], allowing the planner to consider both his present and future
behavior. Each possible pattern of anticipated future consumption will be encoded in a
consumption schedule x : [t, T ]→ ℜ, and the planner’s date-t preferences over candidate
schedules will be assumed to admit a utility representation of the form
U t :=
∫ T
t
δ(s, t)u(x(s), s)ds (2)
(cf. Equation 1) for some strictly positive-valued discounting function δ and some index
function u that is both strictly increasing and strictly concave in its first (consumption)
argument. 7
6 Cf. Wolfram (2003, pp. 952–953): “In many calculations, it is . . . worthwhile to go as far as you can
symbolically, and then resort to numerical methods only at the very end [in order to avoid] the problems
that can arise in purely numerical computations.”
7 Similar representations were proposed by Samuelson (1937) and axiomatized by Koopmans (1960)
and Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982). Frederick et al. (2002) provide an extensive review of theoretical,
experimental, and observational studies relating to this functional form.
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Note that the representation in Equation 2 imposes additive separability of the total
utility into increments contributed by the various scheduling dates, as well as multiplica-
tive separability of the increment contributed by date s into a discount factor δ(s, t)
independent of the rate of consumption and a utility index u(x(s), s) independent of the
calendar date. 8 The discount rate applied at calendar date t to scheduling date s can be
calculated via the relation
ρ(s, t) :=
−δ1(s, t)
δ(s, t)
(3)
(where, as throughout this paper, the subscript denotes differentiation with respect to
the indicated argument). And the convenient normalization δ(t, t) = 1 then leads to the
inverse relation
δ(s, t) = exp
∫ s
t
[−ρ(v, t)] dv. (4)
Given a consumption schedule x, the associated capital schedule k will evolve according
to the law of motion
k1(s) = f(k(s), s)− x(s), (5)
where the technology f supplying the anticipated return on accumulated capital will be
assumed to be both weakly increasing and weakly concave in its first (capital stock)
argument. 9 Using Equation 5 to change variables, we can express the planner’s date-t
objective function as
U t =
∫ T
t
δ(s, t)u(f(k(s), s)− k1(s), s)ds, (6)
to be maximized now by choice of the capital path k.
Our goal is to determine the history h of the capital stock over the domain [0, T ]. At
date t, this history will constrain the planner’s choice of k to among those satisfying
k(t) =

 h(0) =: K for t = 0,h(t) for t > 0; (7)
and we shall impose also the terminal condition
k(T ) = 0. (8)
(See Figure 1.) Hence, in summary, the planner’s problem at calendar date t is to select
a capital path k that maximizes the objective function in Equation 6 subject to the
constraints in Equations 7–8.
2.2. The question of consistency
Strotz inquires (p. 171): “Under what circumstances will an individual who contin-
uously re-evaluates his planned course of consumption confirm his earlier choices and
8 Thus, as Strotz puts it (p. 168), the planner can express his enthusiasm for consuming from
his stock of champagne on the date of his birth by assigning a high value to the utility index
u(two glasses of champagne per diem,planner’s birth date), but this enthusiasm can neither increase nor
decrease as the date approaches.
9 Note that, as implied by Equation 5, capital is consumable (“like rabbits,” according to Phelps and
Pollak, 1968, p. 187).
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Kk(t) = h(t)
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h
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k
Fig. 1. Equations 7–8. A candidate capital path k considered at calendar date t must connect the points
〈t, h(t)〉 and 〈T, 0〉.
follow out the consumption plan originally selected?” Or, in our terminology: Under
what conditions will the solutions to the planner’s problem at different calendar dates
coincide?
The answer to this question (noted already by Burness, 1976) is that coincidental plans
will arise if and only if there exists a function σ satisfying
δ(s, t) =
σ(s)
σ(t)
; (9)
that is, if and only if the discounting function is (multiplicatively) separable. 10 To see
that this property is necessary (its sufficiency is immediate), observe that any capital
schedule kt rendering U t maximal must satisfy the Euler equation
δ(s, t)u1(f(k
t(s), s)− kt1(s), s)f1(k
t(s), s) +
d [δ(s, t)u1(f(k
t(s), s)− kt1(s), s)]
ds
= 0 (10)
at each s ∈ [t, T ]. 11 Equation 10 has first integral
δ(s, t)u1(f(k
t(s), s)− kt1(s), s) exp
∫ T
s
[
−f1(k
t(v), v)
]
dv = τ(t), (11)
where the constant τ(t) can be interpreted as the reciprocal of the shadow price of utility
in terms of date-T consumption. And if the schedule k0 remains optimal at each calendar
date t ∈ (0, T ) then we can let
σ(s) =
[
u1(f(k
0(s), s)− k01(s), s) exp
∫ T
s
[
−f1(k
0(v), v)
]
dv
]−1
, (12)
whereupon Equation 9 holds since τ(t) = δ(t, t)/σ(t) = 1/σ(t).
10Separability is equivalent to the calendar invariance condition that, for each 0 ≤ t < t¯ ≤ s ≤ T and
ǫ > 0, we have δ(s+ ǫ, t)/δ(s, t) = δ(s+ ǫ, t¯)/δ(s, t¯).
11See, e.g., Chiang (1992, pp. 28–36), Gel’fand and Fomin (2000, pp. 14–18), or Luenberger (1969,
pp. 179–183). Equation 10 is in fact both necessary and sufficient for the optimality of kt since
G(k(s), k1(s), s) := δ(s, t)u(f(k(s), s) − k1(s), s) is concave in 〈k(s), k1(s)〉. And this concavity follows,
in turn, from the inequalities G11 = δ
[
u11f21 + u1f11
]
≤ 0, G22 = δu11 ≤ 0, and G11G22 −G12G21 =
δ2u1u11f11 ≥ 0. (See, e.g., Chiang, 1992, pp. 81–91.)
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With regard to the representation in Equation 2, it is common to assume (as does
Strotz) that the discounting function is stationary ; i.e., that there exists a function σ
such that
δ(s, t) = σ(s− t). 12 (13)
Under this assumption, the planner’s point of view undergoes a rigid translation with
the advance of the calendar date, and in a sense the future never actually arrives at the
present. 13
A third possible assumption is that of log-linearity, a property that δ is said to exhibit
whenever it admits a function σ such that
δ(s, t) = e−σ(t)[s−t]. 14 (14)
Such a function, when it exists, supplies the common discount rate applied by the planner
at a given calendar date to all future scheduling dates.
The latter two assumptions on the discounting function are together sufficient for
intertemporal consistency; indeed, any two of separability, stationarity, and log-linearity
jointly imply the third. Thus standard, “exponential” discounting (which satisfies all
three assumptions) is the unique stationary specification of δ that leads to time-consistent
planning.
3. Analysis
3.1. The general case
When the discounting function is inseparable and hence intertemporal consistency
fails, the observed behavior will generally have the “unpleasant feature,” pointed out
by Blackorby et al. (1973, p. 239), that “ex post [it] makes no sense from any point
of view.” The reason for this unpleasantness is that while at each calendar date t our
naive planner will be following a capital schedule kt that appears for the moment to be
optimal, he will adhere to this plan only for an instant and will soon find that he prefers
a new “optimal” schedule kt+dt. Accordingly, although the choice of kt is made with each
future scheduling date taken into consideration, this choice affects the history h only by
determining the instantaneous rate
h1(t) = k
t
1(t) (15)
of capital accumulation at calendar date t. (See Figure 2.)
Using Equations 7 and 15 to calculate
τ(t) = u1(f(h(t), t)− h1(t), t) exp
∫ T
t
[
−f1(k
t(v), v)
]
dv (16)
12Stationarity is equivalent to the absolute invariance condition that, for each 0 ≤ t < t¯ ≤ T and ǫ > 0,
we have δ(t+ ǫ, t) = δ(t¯+ ǫ, t¯).
13Samuelson (1937, p. 160) writes that “as the individual moves along in time there is a sort of perspective
phenomenon in that his view of the future in relation to his instantaneous time position remains invariant,
rather than his evaluation of any particular year.” (See also the commentary of Rosenstein-Rodan, 1934,
cited by Strotz, p. 170.)
14Log-linearity is equivalent to the scheduling invariance condition that, for each 0 ≤ t ≤ s < s¯ ≤ T
and ǫ > 0, we have δ(s+ ǫ, t)/δ(s, t) = δ(s¯+ ǫ, t)/δ(s¯, t).
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0 t T
h
h
kt
h1(t) = kt1(t)
Fig. 2. Equation 15. At calendar date t, the history h must be tangent to the (temporarily) optimal
capital schedule kt.
allows us to rewrite Equation 11 as
δ(s, t)u1(f(k
t(s), s)− kt1(s), s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted marginal utility of consumption
exp
∫ s
t
f1(k
t(v), v)dv︸ ︷︷ ︸
price deflator
= · · ·
· · · = u1(f(h(t), t)− h1(t), t), (17)
an ODE in kt that in combination with the terminal condition
kt(T ) = 0 (18)
can in principle be solved to yield an expression of the form
kt(s) = Θ(s, t, h(t), h1(t)), (19)
valid for s ∈ [t, T ]. Setting s = t in Equation 19 leads to the relation
h(t) = Θ(t, t, h(t), h1(t)), (20)
an ODE in h that in combination with the initial condition
h(0) = K (21)
can (again, in principle) be solved to yield the historical path of the capital stock. And
the associated consumption path m can then be deduced from the law of motion
m(t) := f(h(t), t)− h1(t). (22)
3.2. Linear technologies
Section 3.1 provides a recipe for computing the capital history h from the primitives of
the planner’s problem; namely, the discounting function δ, the index function u, and the
technology f . As we have seen, this computation requires the solution, in sequence, of
two ordinary differential equations, the first (Equation 17) determining kt as a function
of the scheduling date and the second (Equation 20) determining h as a function of the
calendar date. The immediate difficulty in carrying out these tasks analytically is that
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the unknown path kt in Equation 17 affects both the marginal utility of consumption
and the price deflator, and may thus be in a complicated relationship with its derivative
kt1. This ODE will be linear, however, if the technology is itself linear; that is, under the
specification
f l(z, s) := α(s)z + β(s) (23)
for given functions α and β supplying, respectively, a (time-varying) “interest rate” and
a flow of “exogenous income.” In this case the price deflator
Π (s, t) := exp
∫ s
t
α(v)dv (24)
is independent of the optimal capital path, and since the strictly decreasing function
u1(·, s) admits an inverse map u1(·, s)
inv, we can put Equation 17 into the standard form
kt1(s) + [−α(s)]k
t(s) = β(s)− u1(·, s)
inv
(
u1(α(t)h(t) + β(t)− h1(t), t)
δ(s, t)Π (s, t)
)
, (25)
with integrating factor
exp
∫ s
0
[−α(v)] dv = Π(s, 0)
−1
. (26)
Solving the terminal value problem formed by Equations 18 and 25 then leads to the
formula
kt(s) =
∫ T
s
[
u1(·, v)
inv
(
u1(α(t)h(t) + β(t)− h1(t), t)
δ(v, t)Π (v, t)
)
− β(v)
]
dv
Π(v, s)
(27)
for kt on the interval [t, T ], and hence to the expression
h(t) =
∫ T
t
[
u1(·, v)
inv
(
u1(α(t)h(t) + β(t)− h1(t), t)
δ(v, t)Π (v, t)
)
− β(v)
]
dv
Π(v, t)
(28)
for the relation in Equation 20.
Equation 28, the first-order ODE at the heart of this paper, characterizes the history
of the capital stock for the general linear-technology planning problem formulated above.
The assumption of linearity is of course a strong one, and rules out important applications
such as to (nonlinear versions of) the optimal growth model formulated by Ramsey. But
nonlinear capital management problems are for the most part intractable analytically
even in the time-consistent case, and it is not our purpose at present to extend the
existing theory along this dimension. Rather, we wish to broaden the theory to allow for
inseparable discounting functions (see Section 2.2), assuming naivete on the part of the
decision maker instead of the usual sophistication (see Section 1). And in order to do so
we shall restrict attention for the time being to linear-technology scenarios.
3.3. Tractable index functions
We have seen that the assumption of a linear technology reduces the task of determining
the history of the capital stock to that of solving the initial value problem formed by
Equations 21 and 28. This can be accomplished numerically for a wide range of index
functions, but to proceed analytically we shall need to adopt a parametric specification of
u1(·, t) that will allow us to extract its argument α(t)h(t)+β(t)−h1(t) from the integral
9
in Equation 28. And it turns out that two familiar utility specifications have just this
property.
The first case we shall consider is that of the exponential (or — in the context of choice
under uncertainty — constant absolute risk aversion) index function defined, for some
mapping γ : [0, T ]→ (0,∞), by
ue(z, s) := −γ(s)e−z/γ(s), (29)
and with associated marginal utility function
ue1(z, s) = e
−z/γ(s) (30)
(see Figure 3, left panel) and elasticity of intertemporal substitution
ηe(z, s) :=
−ue1(z, s)
zue11(z, s)
=
γ(s)
z
. (31)
With this specification Equation 28 simplifies to
h(t) = [α(t)h(t) + β(t)− h1(t)]
∫ T
t
γ(v)dv
γ(t)Π (v, t)
+ · · ·
· · ·+
∫ T
t
[γ(v) log [δ(v, t)Π (v, t)]− β(v)] dv
Π(v, t)
, (32)
which with the definition
Φe(t) :=
[∫ T
t
γ(v)dv
γ(t)Π (v, t)
]−1
(33)
can be put into the standard form
h1(t) + [Φ
e(t)− α(t)]h(t) = β(t) + Φe(t)
∫ T
t
[γ(v) log [δ(v, t)Π (v, t)]− β(v)] dv
Π(v, t)
. (34)
Selecting a suitable integrating factor
Ψe(t) := exp
∫ t
0
[Φe(v)− α(v)] dv, (35)
the initial value problem in question is then solved by the capital history
h(t) =
K
Ψe(t)
+ · · ·
· · ·+
∫ t
0
Ψe(v)
Ψe(t)
[
β(v) + Φe(v)
∫ T
v
[γ(w) log [δ(w, v)Π (w, v)]− β(w)] dw
Π(w, v)
]
dv. (36)
The second tractable case is that of the power (or constant relative risk aversion) index
function defined, for some “shift” map κ : [0, T ]→ ℜ and parameter p > 0, by
up(z, s) :=
{
[z − κ(s)]
1−1/p
/ [1− 1/p] for p 6= 1,
log [z − κ(s)] for p = 1;
(37)
with associated marginal utility
up1(z, s) = [z − κ(s)]
−1/p
(38)
10
01
0
ue
11
(0, s) = −1/γ(s)
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1
(·, s)
1
0
κ(s) κ(s) + 1
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11
(κ(s) + 1, s) = −1/p
up
1
(·, s)
Fig. 3. Marginal utility curves for the exponential (left panel) and power (right panel) index specifications.
Given the scheduling date s, each curve is strictly decreasing and approaches zero at high rates of
consumption. The parameters γ(s) and p equal the slopes of the lines normal to the marginal utility
curve at, respectively, 0 for the exponential case and κ(s) + 1 for the power case.
(see Figure 3, right panel) and elasticity of intertemporal substitution
ηp(z, s) = p [1− κ(s)/z] . (39)
Defining the shifted income function
−→
β (s) := β(s)− κ(s), (40)
Equation 28 simplifies under this specification to
h(t) =
[
α(t)h(t) +
−→
β (t)− h1(t)
] ∫ T
t
δ(v, t)pdv
Π(v, t)
1−p −
∫ T
t
−→
β (v)dv
Π(v, t)
, (41)
which with the definition
Φp(t) :=
[∫ T
t
δ(v, t)pdv
Π(v, t)
1−p
]−1
(42)
can be put into the standard form
h1(t) + [Φ
p(t)− α(t)]h(t) =
−→
β (t)− Φp(t)
∫ T
t
−→
β (v)dv
Π(v, t)
. (43)
Selecting the integrating factor
Ψp(t) := exp
∫ t
0
[Φp(v)− α(v)] dv, (44)
our initial value problem is then solved by the capital history
h(t) =
K
Ψp(t)
+
∫ t
0
Ψp(v)
Ψp(t)
[
−→
β (v)− Φp(v)
∫ T
v
−→
β (w)dw
Π(w, v)
]
dv. (45)
3.4. Hyperbolic cake consumption
Equations 36 and 45 (together with the definitions in Equations 24, 33/42, 35/44, and
40) provide explicit formulae for the path of a capital stock managed by a naive planner
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Fig. 4. Hyperbolic discount factor (left panel) and rate (right panel) curves; computed for q → 0 (♣),
q = 1 (♦), q = 10 (♥), and q = 100 (♠).
with access to a linear technology and possessing, respectively, exponential and power
utility. It should be noted that, in contrast to much existing work on the sophisticated
case, these formulae impose no conditions whatsoever on the discounting function, which
need not even be stationary. In this sense the naive planning model provides a convenient
laboratory for experimenting with alternative assumptions about time preference.
One notable nonstandard specification of δ, advocated by Loewenstein and Prelec
(1992), among others, is the (stationary) hyperbolic form
δh(s, t) :=
[
1
1 + q [s− t]
]r/q
(46)
with parameters r ≥ 0 and q > 0. The associated discount rate function
ρh(s, t) =
r
1 + q [s− t]
(47)
is decreasing in the scheduling date — a phenomenon often generated in discrete-time
models using the “quasi-hyperbolic” specification introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968)
and popularized by Laibson (1997). And since
δe(s, t) := e−r[s−t] = lim
q→0
δh(s, t), (48)
the parameter q controls the degree of distortion relative to exponential discounting with
rate r. (See Figure 4; cf. Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992, p. 581.)
To try out hyperbolic discounting, let us apply our results from Section 3 to the bench-
mark “cake-eating” problem in which the interest rate and exogenous income functions (α
and β, respectively) are both identically zero. Adopting exponential utility with constant
intertemporal substitutability parameter γ(s) = c > 0, we have
h(t) =
K[T − t]
T
−
cr[T − t]
q
∫ t
0
[∫ T
v
log [1 + q [w − v]] dw
[T − v]2
]
dv (49)
from Equation 36. Evaluating the inner integral and making the substitution y = q[T−v],
we obtain
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h(t) =
K[T − t]
T
−
cr[T − t]
q
∫ qT
q[T−t]
[[1 + y] log [1 + y]− y] dy
y2
. (50)
And evaluating the remaining integral yields the history
h(t) =
K[T − t]
T
+
cr[T − t]
q
[
[1 + y] log[1 + y]
y
+ dilog[−y]
]qT
y=q[T−t]
, (51)
where dilog z denotes the dilogarithm of z (defined on the unit sphere as
∑∞
i=1 z
ii−2
and elsewhere via analytic continuation). Finally, note that as the parameter q → 0 and
δh tends to its exponential limit, the capital history in Equation 51 converges to the
textbook cake-eating formula
h(t) =
K[T − t]
T
−
crt[T − t]
2
(52)
for a time-consistent planner (cf. Luenberger, 1969, p. 182). 15
Alternatively, adopting power utility with shift parameter κ(s) = 0, we have
h(t) = K exp
∫ t
0
[
−
∫ T
v
[1 + q[w − v]]−pr/qdw
]−1
dv (53)
from Equation 45. Evaluating the inner integral (for q 6= pr) yields
h(t) = K exp
∫ t
0
[q − pr]dv
1− [1 + q[T − v]]1−pr/q
. (54)
And as q → 0 this path converges to the time-consistent history
h(t) =
K[epr[T−t] − 1]
eprT − 1
. (55)
The preceding examples demonstrate that even in the simplest of capital management
problems, evaluating the integrals in Equations 36 and 45 to obtain closed-form histories
may require the use of non-elementary functions or may turn out to be infeasible. And
a determined investigation of this issue shows (see Tyson, 2006, pp. 21–23) that our
experience here is typical: While closed-form paths can be computed for a broad class
of problems under exponential utility, difficult integrals will almost always arise under
power utility. 16
4. Comparative statics
4.1. Hyperbolic discounting
Once we have developed an explicit formula for the capital path under a particular
set of functional form assumptions, we are in a position to investigate how our planner’s
15To see this, apply l’Hoˆpital’s Rule three times in succession, making use of the identity d[dilog z]/dz =
−[1/z] log[1− z].
16Specifically, given any capital management problem with linear f , constant α, and continuous β; with
exponential u and constant γ; and with stationary, continuous δ; the history in Equation 36 can be
approximated with arbitrary precision by a path expressible in closed form.
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Fig. 5. Capital (left panel) and consumption (right panel) histories for a problem with exponential utility
and hyperbolic discounting; computed for q → 0 (♣), q = 1 (♦), q = 10 (♥), and q = 100 (♠).
savings and consumption behavior varies with the parameters of the model. For con-
creteness we shall focus on the specific question of whether increasing a given parameter
shifts the consumption profile forward or backward in time (if either), and for simplicity
we shall consider only the case of exponential utility.
Let us say that a parameter z postpones (resp., prepones) consumption if the function
m (defined in Equation 22) has increasing (resp., decreasing) differences in 〈t, z〉; that
is, if ∂m1(t)/∂z ≥ 0 (resp., ≤ 0). Accordingly as the monotonicity and the correspond-
ing inequality are strict, let us say that the postponement or preponement is likewise
strict. It is then clear from Equation 52 that in the standard cake-eating problem, both
the discount rate r and the intertemporal substitutability parameter c strictly prepone
consumption. (Given at least some substitutability, stronger myopia leads the planner to
consume more cake earlier; while given at least some myopia, increased substitutability
has the same effect.) Do these propositions hold more generally in the case of hyper-
bolic discounting? And what is the comparative static effect of the new, “hyperbolicity”
parameter q?
From Equation 51 it is a simple matter to compute the slope
m1(t) = −h11(t) =
−cr log[1 + q[T − t]]
q[T − t]
< 0 (56)
of the consumption path m and its (negative) partial derivatives with respect to r and c.
The first question above can then be answered in the affirmative: These two parameters
continue to strictly prepone consumption no matter how much we distort the discounting
function relative to the exponential benchmark. Moreover, since
∂m1(t)
∂q
=
cr
q
[
log[1 + q[T − t]]
q[T − t]
−
1
1 + q[T − t]
]
> 0 (57)
(the sign following from the identity z log z > z−1, valid for 0 < z 6= 1), we can settle the
second question as well: The hyperbolicity parameter q strictly postpones consumption
by the planner. (See Figure 5.)
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4.2. Generalized quasi-hyperbolic discounting
As the conclusion just reached flatly contradicts the conventional wisdom that hy-
perbolic discounting leads to “undersaving,” it is worth taking a moment to examine
the quasi-hyperbolic model from which that intuition is derived. Although “beta-delta”
discounting was designed by Phelps and Pollak for use in discrete time, it can be trans-
lated into the present continuous-time setting via the (stationary) “generalized quasi-
hyperbolic” specification
δq(s, t) := e−[r¯+q¯[exp[−ξΞ]+1]][s−t]
[
eξΞ + 1
eξΞ + eξ[s−t]
]−[q¯/ξ][exp[−ξΞ]+1]
(58)
with parameters r¯, q¯,Ξ, ξ ≥ 0. The associated function
ρq(s, t) = r¯ + q¯
[
eξΞ + 1
eξΞ + eξ[s−t]
]
(59)
makes clear that r¯ + q¯ and r¯ can be interpreted as the rates of discount in, respectively,
the short and the long term; that Ξ measures the time interval over which the short-term
rate applies; and that ξ controls the speed of the decline in the rate from r¯ + q¯ to r¯
in the vicinity of the scheduling date t + Ξ. (See Figure 6.) Ordinary quasi-hyperbolic
discounting then appears as the special case in which ξ → ∞, 17 while exponential
discounting emerges when either q¯ = 0 or Ξ→∞.
Returning now to the cake-eating problem and imposing generalized quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, we can once again (though with rather more difficulty) calculate the slope
m1(t) = −h11(t) = −c
[
r¯ + q¯
[
1 + e−ξΞ
] [
1 +
1
ξ[T − t]
log
eξΞ + 1
eξΞ + eξ[T−t]
]]
< 0 (60)
of the consumption path associated with the capital history in Equation 36. As might be
expected, both the intertemporal substitutability parameter c and the long-term discount
17Here e−q¯Ξ and e−r¯Ξ play the roles of “beta” and “delta,” respectively.
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rate r¯ generate negative partial derivatives and therefore strictly prepone consumption.
But here the quasi-hyperbolicity parameter q¯ clearly prepones consumption as well — in
contrast to the effect of its analog q in the genuinely hyperbolic case but in agreement
with the conventional wisdom mentioned above. Moreover, this qualitative difference
between the hyperbolic and generalized quasi-hyperbolic scenarios is a straightforward
consequence of how these two discounting functions are parameterized: In the hyperbolic
case, there is less overall discounting of future utility and hence more consumption at later
dates for higher values of q (see again Figure 4); while in the quasi-hyperbolic case there is
more discounting and hence less late consumption for higher values of q¯ (Figure 6). Thus
we see that there is nothing intrinsic to hyperbolic discounting — or, more generally, to
declining discount rates — that leads inevitably to preponement of consumption and any
consequent undersaving. Rather, it is simply that more discounting of the future of any
kind tends to prepone consumption, and under different specifications of the function δ
parameters such as q and q¯ may or may not be associated with such an increase.
4.3. Positive interest rate
As a final, more challenging comparative statics exercise, let us investigate the impact
on our planner’s behavior of the possibility of investment at a constant interest rate
αc(s) := a > 0. Relying as usual on Equation 36, we obtain the capital history
h(t) =
[
1− e−a[T−t]
] [ K + cT
1− e−aT
+
∫ t
0
[∫ T
v
ace−a[w−v] log δ(w, v)dw[
1− e−a[T−v]
]2
]
dv
]
+ · · ·
· · · − c [T − t] . (61)
From this can be derived the remarkably simple expression
m1(t) = ah1(t)− h11(t) = ac
[
1−
∫ T
t
ζ(v, t)dv
ea[v−t] − e−a[T−v]
]
(62)
for the consumption slope, where the function
ζ(s, t) :=
δ2(s, t)
δ(s, t)
(63)
returns a kind of alternative discount rate (equal to the ordinary rate ρ(s, t) whenever δ
is stationary). And routine differentiation then yields the expressions
∂m1(t)
∂c
= a
[
1−
∫ T
t
ζ(v, t)dv
ea[v−t] − e−a[T−v]
]
(64)
and
∂m1(t)
∂a
= c

1−
∫ T
t
ζ(v, t)
ea[v−t] − e−a[T−v]

1− a[T − t]ea[T−t] − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊕
−a[v − t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊖

 dv

 (65)
for the responsiveness of the consumption slope to the intertemporal substitutability and
interest rate parameters.
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Fig. 7. The partial derivative ∂m1(·)/∂a as a function of the calendar date in a problem with exponential
utility, hyperbolic discounting, and parameter settings T = 1, K = 1, a = 12, and c = 1. When
r = q = 50 (left panel), this quantity is comfortably above zero and so the interest rate a strictly
postpones consumption. But when r = q = 100 (right panel), the derivative is negative on the interval
[0, t†], over which a prepones consumption.
Since m1(t) and ∂m1(t)/∂c have the same sign, c postpones or prepones consumption
accordingly as m(t) is increasing or decreasing; i.e., accordingly as the postponing effect
of the investment opportunity outweighs or is outweighed by the preponing effect of
the planner’s discounting of future utility. This is most apparent in the exponential
case (viz., ζe(s, t) = r), where ∂m1(t)/∂c = a[1 − r/a] and its sign is determined by a
straight comparison between the discount and interest rates (a classical result). But more
generally postponement of consumption is consistent with ζ(t, t) > a, as long as ζ(·, t)
falls rapidly enough over the interval [t, T ].
The comparative statics of interest rate variation are somewhat more complex. Under
exponential discounting the integral in Equation 65 vanishes, yielding ∂m1(t)/∂a = c > 0
and strict postponement of consumption. 18 This is of course just what one would expect:
A higher rate of interest is a reason to invest and to consume relatively more later. When
the discount rate ζ(·, t) is declining, however, the integral in question can be positive,
since the contribution of the negative and variable (in v) term ⊖ will be underweighted
against that of the positive and constant term ⊕. And when the discount rate is declining
sharply, this effect can be strong enough to drag ∂m1(t)/∂a below zero and hence to
create preponement of consumption. (See Figure 7, right panel, for an example of such
a pathological scenario.)
The intuition for the possibility of the interest rate acting to prepone consumption
bears a loose analogy to that for the possibility of a Giffen good. The planner consumes
both early and late, and purchases more of the second commodity by choosing higher
values of m1(t). Intertemporal substitutability is his “income”; thus late consumption
is “inferior” when ∂m1(t)/∂c < 0. The “price” of this commodity is −a, so that it is
“Giffen” when −∂m1(t)/∂a = ∂m1(t)/∂[−a] > 0. Now it is clear from Equations 64
18 In fact this assertion is true for any discounting function that is separable (i.e., time-consistent; see
Section 2.2).
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and 65 that m1(t) is “Giffen” only if it is “inferior,” as Marshallian theory demands.
And any preponement of consumption resulting from an interest rate increase can then
be attributed to the “income effect” associated with this “price change.”
Lastly, for the sake of completeness, it is worth recording the specialized forms of
Equation 62 for hyperbolic
m1(t) = ac
[
1− r
∫ T
t
dv
[1 + q [v − t]][ea[v−t] − e−a[T−v]]
]
(66)
and for generalized quasi-hyperbolic
m1(t) = c
[
a− r¯ − q¯
∫ T
t
a[eξΞ + 1]dv
[eξΞ + eξ[v−t]][ea[v−t] − e−a[T−v]]
]
(67)
discounting. Using these formulas, the reader can confirm that our earlier conclusions
about the impact of the parameters r, q, r¯, and q¯ on the consumption profile remain
valid when the interest rate is nonzero.
5. Extensions and applications
5.1. Credit constraints
Apart from the boundary conditions listed in Equations 7–8, the planner’s problem as
defined in Section 2.1 does not restrict his choice of capital path k at calendar date t.
In particular, this formulation endows the agent with an infinite capacity to borrow that
we may at times wish to rein in; for example via the requirement that
k(s) ≥ 0 (68)
for each s ∈ [t, T ]. (More general credit constraints are discussed in Tyson, 2006, pp. 16–
20.)
Let us impose the above inequality in the context of retirement savings, assuming for
simplicity both that K = 0 and that once the agent begins saving (i.e., once the credit
constraint becomes slack) he plans to hold strictly positive capital up until the horizon T .
Defining
t∗ := max{0 ≤ t < T : h(t) = 0}, (69)
we have (when f is linear) that the ODE in Equation 28 holds on the interval [t∗, T ] with
initial condition h(t∗) = 0. And the capital histories
h(t) =

 0 for t < t
∗,∫ t
t∗
Ψe(v)
Ψe(t)
[
β(v) + Φe(v)
∫ T
v
[γ(w) log[δ(w,v)Π(w,v)]−β(w)]dw
Π(w,v)
]
dv for t ≥ t∗;
(70)
for exponential utility and
h(t) =

 0 for t < t
∗,∫ t
t∗
Ψp(v)
Ψp(t)
[−→
β (v)− Φp(v)
∫ T
v
−→
β (w)dw
Π(w,v)
]
dv for t ≥ t∗;
(71)
for power utility can then be obtained as special cases of Equations 36 and 45, respec-
tively.
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It remains only to determine the calendar date t∗ at which the planner commences
saving. By definition this date must satisfy h(t∗) = 0, and we have also that
h1(t
∗) = kt
∗
1 (t
∗) = lim
tրt∗
kt1(t) = lim
tրt∗
0 = 0 (72)
as a consequence of our many tacit smoothness assumptions. Equation 28 then yields the
relation
0 =
∫ T
t∗
[
u1(·, v)
inv
(
u1(β(t
∗), t∗)
δ(v, t∗)Π (v, t∗)
)
− β(v)
]
dv
Π(v, t∗)
, (73)
now to be considered an algebraic equation in t∗ rather than an ODE. And by specializing
this implicit definition to
β(t∗)
Φe(t∗)
=
∫ T
t∗
[β(v)− γ(v) log [δ(v, t∗)Π (v, t∗)]] dv
Π(v, t∗)
(74)
in the case of exponential and
−→
β (t∗)
Φp(t∗)
=
∫ T
t∗
−→
β (v)dv
Π(v, t∗)
(75)
in the case of power utility, we can complete the construction of the credit-constrained
capital histories in Equations 70 and 71, respectively.
As an example, consider an agent active between the ages of 20 and 70 (i.e., T = 50)
and who enters this period with no assets (i.e., K = 0). Assume power utility with p = 1
and κ(s) = 0 everywhere. Let the discounting function be generalized quasi-hyperbolic
with parameters r¯ = 0.03, q¯ = 0.05, Ξ = 3, and ξ = 1. And finally, impose the linear
technology combining the constant interest rate a = 0.04 with the exogenous income
having “impulse” specification
βi(s) := b exp[−χ[B − s]2] (76)
and parameters b = 50, B = 20, and χ = 0.0025.
In the unconstrained case, the decision maker first borrows capital to finance his con-
sumption and then at t ≈ 8 begins to save part of his rapidly-growing income, building
up a “retirement fund” that peaks near h(36) ≈ 190. (See Figure 8.) In the constrained
case, on the other hand, consumption tracks income until t∗ ≈ 10, at which point the
planner embarks on a savings program that peaks near h(34) ≈ 232. The constrained
agent thus begins to save later but accumulates more capital than his unconstrained alter
ego, consuming more in “old age” than does the latter as a result.
5.2. Limited foresight and partial commitment
The current framework can be extended without great difficulty to model decision
makers who do not always take the entire future into account, but rather consider only
the immediate future up to a given “planning horizon.” Denoting the horizon applicable
to calendar date t < T by Ω(t) ∈ (t, T ], we can express our agent’s objective function at
this point in time as
Uˆ t :=
∫ Ω(t)
t
δ(s, t)u(x(s), s)ds (77)
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problem (♣) and its credit-constrained counterpart (♦).
(cf. Equation 2). Writing g(s) for the target level of capital at scheduling date s (should
this date be realized as a planning horizon) and imposing g(T ) = 0, we can then replace
Equation 28 with its limited-foresight generalization
h(t) =
g(Ω(t))
Π (Ω(t), t)
+ · · ·
· · ·+
∫ Ω(t)
t
[
u1(·, v)
inv
(
u1(α(t)h(t) + β(t)− h1(t), t)
δ(v, t)Π (v, t)
)
− β(v)
]
dv
Π(v, t)
. (78)
Specializing to exponential utility (see Equation 29) now requires the modified definitions
Φˆe(t) :=
[∫ Ω(t)
t
γ(v)dv
γ(t)Π (v, t)
]−1
(79)
and
Ψˆe(t) := exp
∫ t
0
[
Φˆe(v)− α(v)
]
dv; (80)
and leads to the capital history
h(t) =
K
Ψˆe(t)
+
∫ t
0
Ψˆe(v)
Ψˆe(t)

 Φˆe(v)g(Ω(v))
Π (Ω(v), v)
+ · · ·
· · ·+ β(v) + Φˆe(v)
∫ Ω(v)
v
[γ(w) log [δ(w, v)Π (w, v)]− β(w)] dw
Π(w, v)

dv (81)
(cf. Equation 36). Similarly, specializing to power utility (see Equation 37) requires the
definitions
Φˆp(t) :=
[∫ Ω(t)
t
δ(v, t)pdv
Π(v, t)
1−p
]−1
(82)
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and
Ψˆp(t) := exp
∫ t
0
[
Φˆp(v)− α(v)
]
dv; (83)
and leads to the history
h(t) =
K
Ψˆp(t)
+
∫ t
0
Ψˆp(v)
Ψˆp(t)
[
Φˆp(v)g(Ω(v))
Π (Ω(v), v)
+
−→
β (v)− Φˆp(v)
∫ Ω(v)
v
−→
β (w)dw
Π(w, v)
]
dv (84)
(cf. Equation 45).
Generalizing our analysis to allow for limited foresight introduces a potential source of
time inconsistency quite independent of any possible nonseparability of the discounting
function: When the horizon Ω(t) varies with t, the planner will generally behave in an
inconsistent fashion even under the standard specification δe (see Equation 48), which
would otherwise guarantee consistency. This fact can be seen most clearly when there is
no discounting whatsoever, as in the following example.
Let T = 100, K = 0, and δ(s, t) = 1 everywhere. Assume power utility with p = 1/2
and κ(s) = 0 everywhere. Impose a linear technology, zero interest, and the impulse-
function income (see Equation 76) with parameters b = 9, B = 50, and χ = 1/2500.
Adopt the “stationary” horizon map
Ωs(t) :=
{
t+ ω for t < T − ω,
T for t ≥ T − ω;
(85)
where ω > 0 measures the (constant) scheduling interval considered by the planner. And
finally, let g(s) = 0 everywhere, so that no provision is made at calendar date t for the
period following Ω(t).
In the problem just posed, setting ω = 100 amounts to assuming unlimited foresight.
Under this assumption, since the interest and discount rates are both zero, the agent
first borrows and then saves to create a constant consumption path over his “lifetime.”
(See Figure 9.) As the planning window controlled by ω narrows, perfect consumption
smoothing continues to be achieved only on the interval [T −ω, T ], while at earlier dates
the decision maker’s consumption begins to track his income. Here the permanent income
hypothesis fails for the obvious reason that inflows arriving after the horizon Ω(t) are
not taken into account in date t planning, and as a result consumption diverges from
the unlimited-foresight benchmark whenever average income over [t,Ω(t)] differs from
average lifetime income.
As well as creating a new source of time inconsistency, the generalization to limited
foresight gives us two additional degrees of freedom in specifying the planner’s behavior.
Firstly, the function Ω need not have the stationary form in Equation 85: It could be used
to model foresight that increases or decreases over time; it could consist of a series of
checkpoints that must be reached before the horizon changes; or it could be determined
endogenously by contemplation costs or other such factors. And secondly, the function g
need not be identically zero, as in the above example: It could return a fixed level of
savings (e.g., “Keep two years’ basic expenses in reserve.”) except near T ; it could be
proportional to the income function β (e.g., “Keep one year’s salary in reserve.”); or it
could be influenced by the planner’s income — or lack of income — after the date in
question. In short, both Ω and g can be chosen so as to implement a variety of behavioral
rules.
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imperfect foresight; computed for ω = 100 (♣), ω = 50 (♦), ω = 25 (♥), and ω = 10 (♠).
Suppose now that we set the target function g equal everywhere to the ex-ante-optimal
capital schedule k0, which solves Equation 10 for t = 0 with the boundary conditions
k0(0) = K and k0(T ) = 0. (Denote the associated consumption schedule, related to k0
via Equation 5, by x0.) Then, at calendar date t < T , the agent planning his consumption
over the period [t,Ω(t)] will be subject to the terminal constraint k(Ω(t)) = k0(Ω(t)),
and it follows that the ratio
℘(t) :=
T − Ω(t)
T − t
∈ [0, 1) (86)
can be interpreted as a measure of his commitment to the plan k0 at this point in time.
For instance, when the horizon function is stationary, increasing either the date t or the
parameter ω increases the fraction of remaining time over which the planner can exercise
discretion, and thus decreases the commitment ratio ℘.
As an example of partial commitment, implemented in this fashion, consider again the
planning problem set out in Section 5.1 above and adopt the stationary horizon map Ωs.
In this setting, the ex-ante-optimal consumption plan x0 is U-shaped due to the discount
rate crossing the interest rate from above. (See Figure 10.) Letting ω → 0 amounts to
assuming full commitment to this plan, while setting ω = 50 returns us to the unlimited-
foresight case and grants the planner no ability to commit, resulting in significantly less
saving. For intermediate values of ω, the capital and consumption paths trace out a
homotopy between these two extremes. And it is in such cases that commitment can be
described as partial: At each moment our agent feels the pull of the “retirement plan”
k0 formulated at age 20 with the aid of his financial advisor, but at no point is he bound
to follow this plan exactly. Indeed, the “salience of the present” causes him to constantly
fall short of his ambition to save, with the extent of this failure being determined jointly
by the quasi-hyperbolicity and planning window parameters q¯ and ω.
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